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１　Introduction
 When asymmetry among bidders exists, all bidders cannot be treated 
alike in a first-price sealed-bid auction. Indeed, the literature has shown that 
when facing asymmetric bidders, the auctioneer may actually be better off 
exploiting this asymmetry by implementing price-preference treatment ?see 
Myerson ????; Krishna ?????. The typical finding is that the effects of such 
preferential treatment depend on the extent of the asymmetry between the 
favored and nonfavored firms.? It has also been shown that asymmetry may 
act as a barrier to entry and may therefore potentially lessen competition 
?McAfee and McMillan ??????; Harstad et al. ???????. Therefore, it is 
important to assess asymmetry among bidders when considering policies 
aimed at efficient and revenue-maximizing auction mechanisms. The 
purpose of this paper is to identify the existence and extent of asymmetry 
between entrant and incumbent firms in electric power procurement auctions 
in Japan. 
 In the Japanese retail electricity market, ten firms originally supplied 
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electricity locally as monopolists. Liberalization began in ????, with new 
firms, called Power Producers and Suppliers ?PPS?, allowed to enter the 
market and supply electricity. With this wave of liberalization, public agencies 
started to utilize first-price sealed-bid auctions for electric power supply 
contracts. Using bids data from these public electric power procurement 
auctions, we assess the difference in underlying costs and bidding patterns 
between the former monopolists and the PPS in this market. We define the 
former monopolists as incumbents, and the PPS as entrants. If there is large 
asymmetry in their underlying costs and bidding patterns, the introduction 
of preference treatment to enhance competition and increase auctioneer 
revenue may be suggested.?
 In general, new entrants may be at a significant disadvantage relative to 
incumbents in auctions. For instance, they may face higher uncertainty because 
of a lack of experience. They may also have access to less information that 
incumbent bidders may have regarding pricing and cost. That is, in the sense 
of the common value paradigm where the value of the object is assumed to be 
unknown to the bidders at the time of the auction, incumbents may be better 
informed of the value of the object while entrants may have comparatively 
little information. In contrast, incumbents may face an entrant they know little 
about, while entrants have already learned about an incumbent?s characteristics 
before they enter the market. That is, in the sense of the private value 
paradigm, where it is assumed that each bidder knows the value of the object, 
the distribution of entrants? private information as perceived by an incumbent 
may have greater variance.? Accordingly, information asymmetry should exist 
in the Japanese electricity market, and we would expect that entrants cost 
distribution has greater dispersion. 
 In addition, the cost structures for entrants and incumbents in this 
market differ significantly. In the main, all incumbent firms are vertically 
integrated and have production divisions, while most entrants purchase 
electricity from outside sources, including the wholesale power exchange 
market ?the Japan Electric Power Exchange or JEPX?. Even for entrants 
that own production divisions, cost disadvantages may still exist because 
entrants only have thermal power stations that incur higher electricity 
generation costs than equivalent nuclear power plants, as possessed by 
most incumbents.? Further, the transmission network is operated only by 
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incumbents. Therefore, entrants must pay transmission fees to incumbents 
to use their transmission network to supply electricity to consumers.? Put 
simply, entrants generally bear a higher cost of supplying electricity. 
 Because of these informational and structural disadvantages, we expect 
in turn that the distribution of underlying costs for entrants has greater mean 
and variance. Our main purpose is to clarify the existence and extent of such 
asymmetry.
 We find that while asymmetry exists, its direction and extent depend 
on the experience of the entrants. Our findings suggest that the cost 
distribution of entrants has relatively more density in the lower tail when 
entrants do not have much experience, while it has relatively less density 
in the lower tail when they gain experience. One reason for the lower 
underlying costs of entrants when they have less experience may be that 
some entrants, because of a lack of experience, believe they have lower costs 
than they really have. Alternatively, because of a lack of information about 
entrants, incumbents may believe that entrants have lower costs than they 
really have. Because this phenomenon disappears in auctions where entrants 
have relatively more experience, there must be an information acquiring ?or 
learning? process by the participants in these auctions.
 Previous studies have shown that asymmetries potentially arise from 
firm size, as noted by Laffont et al. ??????, capacity constraints, as in Jofre-
Bonet and Pesendorfer ??????, the possession of better information, as in 
Hendricks and Porter ??????, distance from where the service is required, as 
in Bajari ?????? and Flambard and Perrigne ??????, and collusion among 
bidders, as in Porter and Zona ?????? and Bajari and Ye ??????. While 
asymmetries among bidders caused by many different sources have been 
empirically examined in existing work, the investigation of asymmetries 
between incumbent and entrant firms is not common in the literature. The 
notable exception is De Silva et al. ?????? who investigate differences in the 
bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions in 
Oklahoma. Their findings are consistent with the presumption that entrants 
are less efficient and their cost distribution has greater dispersion.
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section ? briefly 
explains the theory of asymmetric auctions. Section ? describes our data. 
This section also provides a brief overview of the structure and liberalization 
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of the Japanese electricity industry and the letting process of the electric 
power procurement auctions in this industry. Section ? provides the empirical 
model and the results. Section ? concludes.
２　Theory
 This section summarizes an asymmetric auction model. We follow 
Maskin and Riley ?????a, b?. Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction 
where two risk-neutral bidders compete for a public contract. The cost of the 
contract ci to bidder i is drawn from a known distribution Fi with support ?cLi, 
cHi?. We first assume that the cost of each bidder is distributed independently. 
The distribution is continuous and twice-continuously differentiable on ?cLi, 
cHi?. The density f i is assumed to be strictly positive on ?cLi, cHi?. Maskin and 
Riley ?????b? show that bid functions are in equilibrium increasing and 
differentiable, and for each firm i, an inverse exists and is also differentiable.
 Let ?j denote firm j?s inverse bid function. Then, at the Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium, each bidder i chooses a bid b to maximize his expected profit:??????? ? ?? ????? ? ?? ???????
 The equilibrium of this model is characterized as the solution to a 
system of differential equations with boundary conditions, one for each 
bidder. Maskin and Riley ?????b? have also shown that the solution is 
unique. Specifically, for each bidder i:
 
?????????? ? ? ? ?? ???????? ????? ??? ??????
where ?i is evaluated at b in ?b*, b*? and where b* and b* are the minimum and maximum winning bids, respectively. The boundary conditions are: ? ?? ??? ?? ? ? ??? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ???? ?? ? ???? ?? ? ?? ??
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 Maskin and Riley ?????a? show that if the distribution of the private 
cost of a weak bidder stochastically dominates the distribution of the private 
cost of a strong bidder, a weak bidder will bid more aggressively than the 
strong bidder in the sense that for any fixed cost, the bid of the weak bidder 
will be lower than the bid of the strong bidder. Further, the equilibrium bid 
distribution should also exhibit stochastic dominance. 
 However, stochastic dominance does not hold in many situations, and 
De Silva et al. ?????? discuss what we can say about bidding behavior when 
stochastic dominance does not hold for the entire range of cost distributions 
when considering asymmetric bidding between entrants and incumbents. 
Assuming that cHi? cHj? cH and cLi? cLj? cL, De Silva et al. ?????? show 
that even when stochastic dominance does not hold for the entire range, if 
the distribution of the cost estimates of bidder i stochastically dominates that 
of bidder j in the neighborhood of cL, then for every bid submitted in the 
neighborhood of b*, the associated cost for bidder i will be higher than the cost for bidder j. That is, bidder i will be more aggressive in their bids in the 
lower tail of the distribution of bids. De Silva et al. ?????? also generalize 
the result to a model where the cost of the contract ci to bidder i exhibits 
both private and common value characteristics.
３　The electricity procurement auction data
3. 1　The electricity industry
 As discussed earlier, liberalization began in the Japanese retail 
electricity market in ???? when new firms, known as PPS, were permitted to 
enter the market and supply power to large demanders of electricity, i.e. those 
with power and voltage requirements greater than ?,??? kilowatts ?kW? 
and ??,??? volts ?V?, respectively. In ????, the target for liberalization 
was expanded to demanders with power and voltage requirements greater 
than ???kW and ?,???V, and again in ???? to demanders with power 
requirements greater than ??kW.
 Despite these ongoing attempts at deregulation, incumbents remain 
the dominant type of firm in the industry. Figure ? depicts electric power 
generation in ???? by the type of generator. EPCos ?electricity power 
companies? refers to the incumbents. As shown, total electric power 
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generation in ???? is ???,???,??? kWh, most of which is generated by the 
incumbents.? Figure ? plots the share of deregulated customers held by the 
PPS between ???? and ????. As shown, this remains very small at around ?.? 
Figure ??  Electric power generation in ???? by generator type ?Total 
???,???,??? kWh. Constructed by the author from METI. Self-
generation not included: textquotedblleft Otherstextquotedblright 
refers to special electric utilities?
Figure ??PPS share in the deregulated retail market
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percent.
 With liberalization, public agencies began to utilize bidding systems 
for electric power supply contracts for public places, including waterworks, 
roadway facilities, schools, hospitals, and markets. The letting process is as 
follows. Each public agency advertises auctions on its Web site, in the official 
gazette or in newspapers, with detailed information including the required 
maximum ?peak? power ?kW?, the amount of electricity to be supplied 
?kWh?, the delivery period and place, the qualification for participating in 
tendering procedures, and the time limit for tender. The firm submitting 
the lowest bid wins the auction and is paid the total of its bid times the 
tax rate. Although a reserve price exists, it is usually not announced ?even 
after the bids are opened?. If the lowest bid is higher than the reserve price, 
then the contract is not offered. In such a case, the agency either offers a 
second auction or bargains with one of the bidders. In the case of the latter, a 
supplier will eventually supply the electricity at a negotiated rate.
 For incumbents, these contracts auctioned by public agencies are 
not major activities, accounting for less than ?% of their total supply to 
deregulated customers. Instead, their focus remains on large private users, 
to which they supply electricity at publicly announced rates, or at rates 
determined by a bargaining process. Therefore, capacity constraints are 
unlikely to be binding for the incumbents in these auctions. In fact, the 
incumbents began supplying these same public agencies before the auctions 
began, clearly showing that the incumbents hold sufficient capacity.
 In contrast, public agencies are relatively more important customers for 
the entrants, with the amount supplied through these auctions accounting for 
??.?%, ??.?%, ??.?%, and ?.?% of their total supply in ????, ????, ????, and 
????, respectively. Nevertheless, we can also expect that capacity constraints 
are also unlikely to be binding for entrants. To see why, we compare the total 
power requirements in these contracts and the plant capacity of the entrants.
 The total electric power requirements for these contracts were ??? 
megawatts ?mW?, ??? mW, ???? mW, and ???? mW in ????, ????, ????, 
and ????, respectively. To find the entrants? generation capacity, we should 
include both their own plant capacity and their outside generation sources, 
with which the PPS undertake bilateral contracts. Although it is difficult 
to precisely measure this outside capacity, Asano ?????? estimates that the 
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total capacity of the PPS was ?.? gigawatts ?GW? in ???? and was expected 
to reach ?.? GW in ????. Therefore, the generation capacities of the PPS are 
likely to be much larger than the total power required by these auctions.
3. 2　The winning bid data
 This sub-section describes the dataset that consists of the winning bids 
of all of the electricity procurement auctions held throughout Japan between 
April ???? and March ????. The data are offered by the Electric Daily 
News, a newspaper specializing in the electricity industry. The data contain 
information on the date the bids are opened, the government agency ?the 
auctioneer?, the required maximum power ?kW?, the amount of electricity 
required ?kWh?, the contract period, and the delivery place, along with the 
winner for each auction, the winning bid, either the bidder or the number of 
other bidders, and other descriptive auction information, including whether 
there is a restriction on CO? emissions.? While the dataset contains a rich 
number of observations, its disadvantages are that it does not include losing 
bids and that identification of the losing bidders is not possible for many of 
the observations.
 A total of ?,??? auctions without missing information are observed 
from April ???? to March ????.? Nineteen different firms participate in 
these auctions, comprising nine incumbents and ten entrants. As noted 
earlier, we define the former monopolists as incumbents, and the PPS as 
entrants. The incumbent firms still mainly operate only in their local area. 
Therefore, we do not observe any auctions where multiple incumbents bid.
 Table ? provides some summary statistics. As shown, the auctions are 
not very competitive with the average number of active participants only 
ranging from ?.?? to ?.??. Moreover, in many auctions the incumbent is the 
only bidder: the PPS are not participating in all auctions. 
 The number of bidders increased in ????, but decreased afterwards. 
This may reflect the fact that the number of auctions with CO? emission 
restrictions has gradually increased since ????. Green refers to a dummy 
variable that takes a value of ? if the auction has any restrictions regarding 
CO? emissions, zero otherwise. On this basis, ??% in ???? and ??% of 
auctions in ???? represent auctions including restrictions on CO? emissions. 
Because entrants usually only operate thermal power stations ?that generate 
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relatively more CO? , they are particularly disadvantaged in auctions with 
CO? emission restrictions.
 The average winning bids have been increasing during this period. 
Both the maximum ?peak? power ?kW? and the size ?kWh? decreased 
until ???? but increased in ????. The downward trend until ???? reflects 
the fact that the number of auctions of relatively small size increased with 
the progress of liberalization. In ????, we observe many public agencies 
bundling several contracts in a single auction. This may be the reason for the 
increased size in ????. Load refers to the load factor: the ratio of the average 
and maximum ?peak? usage of electricity during the contract period. This is 
calculated as the amount required per year divided by the required capacity, i.e. 
?kWh? / ?the maximum power ?kW? ? ?? ? ????. In general, the low load 
factor induces inefficiency because suppliers need to hold capacity for peak 
usage that is not used for most of the time.
 The load factor appears to play an important role in the auction 
participation and bidding decisions of firms. Table ? provides summary 
statistics of winning bids by load factor. As shown in the first two columns, 
winning bids decrease as the load factor increases, implying that firms can 
enjoy greater efficiencies with a high load factor. In the third column, we can 
see that the winning rate of entrants significantly decreases with the load 
factor. In point of fact, this is partly because an entrant?s participation rate 
also decreases with the load factor, as shown in the fifth column ?figures in 
parentheses are participation rates?. The sixth column indicates the number 
of auctions where entrants win and the entrant winning rate conditional on 
entrant participation. These again decrease with the load factor. It would 
then appear that entrants have a significant disadvantage in auctions with 
Table ??Auctions from FY???? to FY????
FY # of # of Average winning kW kWh Load Green
Auction Bidder Bid ?yen/kWh? ?thousand?
???? ??? ?.?? ??.?? ????.?? ????.?? ?.?? ?.??
???? ??? ?.?? ??.?? ????.?? ????.?? ?.?? ?.??
???? ??? ?.?? ??.?? ????.?? ????.?? ?.?? ?.??
???? ??? ?.?? ??.?? ????.?? ????.?? ?.?? ?.??
Total ???? ?.?? ??.?? ????.?? ????.?? ?.?? ?.??
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a high load factor. In other evidence, Takagi and Hosoe ?????? note that 
as entrants depend on peak power supply, such as petroleum thermal, 
supplying electricity continuously throughout the day is relatively costly. 
Therefore, in auctions requiring high load factors, entrants are likely to have 
a disadvantage.
 In the next section, we present the empirical results for the asymmetry 
between incumbents and entrants after controlling for various factors in the 
next section.
４　Empirical specification and results
 The basic structure of the regression model is as follows:?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ???
where the subscript i refers to an auction. Because we have winning bid data, 
the data are at auction level. We specify the average winning bid  ?yen/kWh?, 
as dependent variable throughout our analysis. The independent variables 
comprise three sets of controls, where X?s is the control for the auction-
level variables, D is a vector of district fixed effects, and T is a vector of year 
dummies. Because there is only one incumbent in each district, D can also be 
considered as incumbent fixed effects.
 With respect to auction characteristics X, we include the following 
variables. In order to distinguish entrants and incumbents, we simply include 
an incumbent dummy variable that takes a value of ? if the winner is an 
Table ??Load factor and bid differences between incumbents and entrants
Load Win bid of Win bid of Entrant # # #
factor incumbent entrant win rate observations with entrants entrant wins
????% ??.?? ??.?? ?.?? ?? ?? ??.?%? ?? ???  %?
?????% ??.?? ??.?? ?.?? ??? ?? ??.?%? ?? ??.?%?
?????% ??.?? ??.?? ?.?? ??? ??? ??.?%???? ??.?%?
?????% ??.?? ??.?? ?.?? ??? ??? ??.?%???? ??.?%?
?????% ??.?? ??.?? ?.?? ??? ?? ??.?%? ?? ??.?%?
??%?? ??.?? ??.?? ?.?? ?? ? ?.?%? ? ???  %?
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incumbent. We also include the number of bidders. We expect that auctions 
will be more competitive and bids more aggressive as the number of bidders 
increases. The number of bidders, however, may have a negative effect if 
auctions are common valued because of the existence of a winner?s curse. 
Because winner?s curse is more significant when the number of bidders is 
large, bidders may become less aggressive as the number of bidders increases 
in common value auctions.
 We also include a high-voltage dummy that takes a value of ? if the 
contract for auction is for voltage greater than ??,???V. We also include the 
load factor as independent variable. Because bids appear to increase with the 
load factor, but not linearly, we also include its square. The peak power ?kW? 
and the size ?kWh? are also included. However, because the two variables 
kW and kWh perfectly determine the load factor, we include only one in the 
empirical model. We expect that the size kWh negatively affects winning 
bids as firms of a larger size can enjoy scale economies. For a similar reason, 
we expect that the contract length ?year? has a negative effect on winning 
bids. The variable green is included to identify auctions with CO? emission 
restrictions.
 We also include a dummy variable single in our empirical model that 
takes a value of ? if no entrant participates in the auction. Because we do 
not typically observe multiple incumbents in an auction, there is only one 
bidder ?the incumbent? in the auction when single??. We include this 
variable in order to control for the participation decision of entrants. As 
shown in Table ?, we readily observe that entrants do not participate in all 
auctions. For example, only ?.? percent of auctions with a load factor greater 
than ??% are observed to include entrants. If we cannot control for all of 
the variables that affect the participation decision of entrants and bidding 
behavior simultaneously, our results are likely to be biased. Gilley and 
Karels ?????? point out the importance of a link between the dichotomous 
bidding decision ?bid, do not bid? and the bid level decision, and suggest 
using Heckman two - stage estimation ?Heckman ?????. However, as we 
do not have data on losing bids and cannot identify losing firms, we cannot 
employ this estimation method. Therefore, we control for auctions where an 
incumbent is the only bidder using this dummy variable.
 Table ? presents the estimation results with and without kW and kWh. 
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The dependent variable is the average winning bid ?yen/kWh?. The results 
are robust to the four specifications given in the table. Most importantly, the 
incumbent dummy has a positive and significant effect on the winning bid. 
That is, entrants win with much more aggressive bids compared with the 
bids of incumbents. The results show that there is clearly an asymmetry in 
bidding patterns between incumbents and entrants.
 Our estimation results shed light on several other facts. The dummy 
variable single has a negative and significant effect on the winning bid. 
Table ??Estimation results: Basic specification
??? ??? ??? ???
Incumbent wins ??.???* ??.???* ??.???* ??.??%
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Number of bidders ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Single ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???%*** ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
High voltage ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Load ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???%*** ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Load ? ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Kw ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.????
Kwh ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.????
Contract length ??.??? ??.??? ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Green ??.??? ??.??? ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Constant ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
F-statistic ???.?? ???.?? ???.?? ???.??
R-squared ?.???? ?.???? ?.???? ?.????
# of obs. ???? ???? ???? ????
?Notes? Dependent variable is average winning bid ?yen/kwh?. ??? to ??? include 
district and year dummies. Standard errors in parentheses.
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This may imply that entrants do not enter auctions in which they have a 
significant disadvantage. We can also see that the number of bidders has 
a negative and significant effect on the average bid. This may suggest that 
the electric power procurement auctions are likely to fit the private value 
paradigm.? Contracts for voltage greater than ??,???V are won with a lower 
bid. As expected, the load factor has a negative and significant effect on the 
winning bid, though this effect appears to weaken with higher values of the 
load factor.
 The coefficients on size ?kWh? and contract length are negative ?except 
in specification ????, implying scale economies exist. These effects are, 
however, not statistically significant. The variable green has a positive effect 
implying that auctions with CO? emission restrictions are more costly for 
suppliers. However, this effect is again statistically insignificant.
 We next utilize quantile regressions to see whether entrants bid 
aggressively across the entire range of the distribution. As shown in Section 
?, even when stochastic dominance does not hold, a bidder, whose cost 
distribution stochastically dominates the other at the lower end of the 
distribution, should bid aggressively near the minimum winning bids ?De 
Silva et al. ???????. To see this, we are particularly interested in the bidding 
behavior at the lower quantile. For the quantile regressions, we use the 
observations of auctions with entrants ?that is, single??? and with a range 
of load factor between ??% and ??%.?? 
 Table ? presents the results from the quantile regressions.?? We can 
see that the effect of the incumbent dummy is positive for any quantile. This 
may suggest that entrants bid aggressively across the entire range and that 
stochastic dominance holds between the two distributions. The effect is, 
however, significant only for the ? percentile of the winning bid. We can also 
see that the winning bids of entrants are smaller than those of incumbents by 
a larger margin at the lower quantile than the higher quantile, except at the 
?? percentile.
 We next divide our sample into two groups. The first group consists 
of observations of auctions with required electric peak power and voltage 
requirements greater than ?,???kW and ??,???V. As described before, this 
range of electric power demand has been liberalized since ????. Therefore, 
entrants have several years of experience in supplying electric power for 
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this first type of demand in our dataset ?Note our data start in ?????. 
The second group consists of the remaining observations of auctions with 
lower demand. The key feature is that liberalization of the market for a 
lower level of demand took place only after ????. Therefore, the entrants 
have relatively less experience in supplying electric power for this second 
type of demand in our dataset ?assuming that supplying electric power 
to large or small demanders differs in at least some aspects and suppliers 
cannot use experience from meeting large demanders when providing for 
smaller demanders?. By examining the two groups separately, we are able 
to see whether the relative positions of the two cost distributions changes 
depending on the entrants? experience.
Table ??Estimation results: Quantile regression
.?? .?? .?? .??
Incumbent wins ??.???*** ??.??? ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Number of bidders ??.???*** ??.??? ??.???* ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
High voltage ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???*
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Load ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???** ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Load ? ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Kwh ??.??? ??.???*** ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Contract length ??.???*** ??.??? ??.??? ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.??? ??.????
Green ??.???*** ??.??? ??.???* ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Constant ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ???.????
Pseudo R-squared ??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
# of obs. ??? ??? ??? ???
Notes? Dependent variable is average winning bid ?yen/kwh?. The sample consists of 
observations of auctions with entrants and with a load factor of ?????%. All 
equations include district and year dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses.
399
Waseda Global Forum No. ?, ????, ???????
 Table ? presents the results for the first group. With this type of 
demand, entrants have relatively more experience. We can see that the table 
provides similar results as Table ?. In contrast, Table ? presents the results for 
the second group. In these auctions, entrants have relatively less experience. 
We can see that in Table ?, the effects of the incumbent dummy on the 
lower quantiles of the winning bids are negative and significant while those 
on the higher quantiles are positive and significant. That is, incumbents bid 
more aggressively at the lower end of the winning bid distribution and less 
aggressively at the higher end.
 The results from the second group also show that stochastic dominance 
does not hold between the cost distributions of incumbents and entrants for 
these auctions, because the sign of the coefficient for the incumbent dummy 
Table ?? Quantile regression: Power and voltage greater than ?,??? kw and 
??,???V ?Entrants have relatively more experience?
.?? .?? .?? .??
Incumbent wins ??.???*** ??.???** ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Number of bidders ??.???*** ??.??? ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Load ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Load ? ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Kwh ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Contract length ??.???*** ??.??? ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Green ??.???*** ??.??? ??.??? ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Constant ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???** ??.???
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ????.????
Pseudo R-squared ?.???? ?.???? ?.???? ?.????
# of obs. ?? ?? ?? ??
Notes? Dependent variable is average winning bid ?yen/kwh?. The sample consists of 
observations of auctions with entrants, with a load factor of ?????%, and power 
and voltage higher than ?,???kw and ??,???V. All equations include district and 
year dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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is not consistent. Further, if the assumption of a common range holds, 
then the results can be interpreted that the cost distribution of incumbents 
stochastically dominates at the lower end ?though not entirely? and thus, 
entrants bid aggressively at the lower end. That is, the density of entrants? 
cost at the lower end is greater than that of incumbents in auctions where 
entrants have little experience.
 The different results from the two sample groups imply that the 
relative positions of the two distributions differs depending on entrant 
experience. That is, while the entrants? cost distribution exhibits greater 
density at the lower end when they have less experience, it stochastically 
dominates the incumbents as entrants acquire experience.
 We can also interpret this result in that the greater density of 
Table ?? Quantile regression: Power and voltage less than ?,??? kw and 
??,???V ?Entrants have relatively less experience?
.?? .?? .?? .??
Incumbent wins ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.??? ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Number of bidders ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.??? ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Load ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.??? ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Load ? ??.???*** ??.??? ??.??? ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Kwh ??.???*** ??.??? ??.??? ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Contract length ??.???*** ??.???* ??.??? ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Green ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.??? ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ??.???? ??.????
Constant ??.???*** ??.???*** ??.???* ??.???***
??.???? ??.???? ???.???? ??.????
Pseudo R-squared ?.???? ?.???? ?.???? ?.????
# of obs. ?? ?? ?? ??
Notes? The sample consists of auctions with entrants. Dependent variable is average bid 
?yen/kwh?. All equations include district and year dummies. Standard errors are 
in parentheses.
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entrant costs in the lower tail is because some entrants, due to their lack 
of experience, may believe that they have lower costs than they really have. 
However, as they gain experience, they adjust their estimates. Consequently, 
the density of the cost estimates in the lower tail also becomes lower. It may 
also be that incumbents at first believe that entrants potentially have lower 
costs than they really have. As a consequence, the entrant cost distribution, as 
perceived by the incumbents, has greater density at the lower end. However, 
as incumbents learn more about the entrants, they update their perceptions 
and the cost distribution of entrants begins to stochastically dominate that of 
the incumbents. Our findings are consistent with this account.
５　Conclusion
 This study explores differences in the underlying cost distributions of 
entrants and incumbents in electric power procurement auctions in Japan. In 
this market, there is significant asymmetry in the production cost structure 
of the incumbents and the entrants. Therefore, we expect that entrants incur 
higher costs because of specific features of their production process.
 Nevertheless, we observed that the cost distribution of entrants has 
greater density in the lower tail relative to that of incumbents in auctions 
where entrants have relatively less experience. This may be because some 
entrants, due to a lack of experience, believe that they have lower costs than 
they really have. Alternatively, it may be because the incumbents, due to a 
lack of information about the entrants, believe that the entrants have lower 
costs than they really have. This phenomenon disappears in auctions where 
entrants have relatively more experience, suggesting an information acquiring 
?or learning? process is at play.
 We intend to conduct future research in this area in the following 
directions. First, because of the limited nature of our dataset, the current 
study is restricted to very simple estimation methods. For example, because 
our dataset is at the auction level, we cannot include any individual level 
variables in the estimation model, and we cannot fully control for the 
participation decisions of entrants. We are now in the process of collecting 
losing bids along with the identities of the losing bidders for each auction, 
and so we should be able to address this shortcoming in future work.
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 Second, although our reduced form estimation provides some 
very interesting insights, to obtain more concrete results in terms of the 
differences between incumbents and entrants, we need to recover their cost 
distributions through estimating the structural model in Maskin and Riley 
?????a?. As a way forward, previous studies, such as Guerre et al. ?????? 
and Flambard and Perrigne ??????, employ nonparametric methods to 
recover the distributions of the bidder?s type parameters.
 Finally, because auctions where entrants have more experience 
completely coincide with those for a larger size ?greater than ?,???kW and 
??,???V?, the different results for the two different groups of auctions with/
without entrant experience may merely reflect the difference in the auction 
type, not in the experience of the entrants. To see how entrant bidding 
behavior actually changes with experience, we need to estimate a structural 
model that explicitly takes into account the bidder's learning process.
?????????
?  Under general assumptions, Cantillon ?????? has shown that the auctioneer?s expected 
revenue becomes lower as bidders become more asymmetric. Accordingly, serious 
asymmetry may imply greater potential to improve competition through a preferential 
policy.
?  We commonly observe examples of price-preference policies like this in the real 
world, including the recent spectrum auctions held by the Federal Communications 
Commission that employed various discriminatory policies in the spirit of affirmative 
action.
?  Because the auctions for electric power supply contracts in Japan only began after 
liberalization, neither the incumbents nor the entrants had experience of auction 
processes. Therefore, our incumbents are incumbents only in terms of the electric power 
supply business, not the auctions. However, while both the incumbents and entrants 
were new to auctions when they started, it is likely that the former already had some 
information about the auctioneers as they had dealt with them previously. Similarly, 
entrants could learn about incumbents before they entered the market because the 
historical prices of the incumbents were publicly available.
?  In ????, ??.? percent of incumbent electricity generation was from nuclear power, with 
??.?? percent from thermal power and ?.?? percent from hydropower. In contrast, 
less than ?.? percent of entrant electricity generation was from hydropower with the 
remainder provided by thermal power.
?  Transmission fees typically range from ?.?? to ?.?? yen/kWh, with a fixed fee ranging 
from ???.?? to ???.?? yen/kW, depending on the area, time, and voltage.
?  Self-generation is not included.
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?  Since November ????, the Environmental-Conscious Contract Law has been enforced 
in Japan. This law clarifies the public sector?s responsibility to take into account not 
only economic concerns, but also the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions when it 
signs a contract. Specifically, contracts concerning the purchase of electricity and official 
vehicles, as well as service contracts, such as those with energy service companies 
?ESCO? and architects, are subject to the law. Under the law, public agencies began to 
set numerical targets, such as a maximum CO? emission coefficient, as a qualification 
for participating in auctions.
?  The Japanese fiscal year starts in April. Hereafter, we use ?year? to denote the fiscal 
year unless otherwise noted.
?  Gilley and Karels ?????? show that one of the basic qualitative predictions in the 
common value paradigm is that ?greater number of competitors on a tract will lower 
the optimal bid of the firm? ?in higher value auctions for oil tracts?. This is because 
if a bid wins against a relatively large number of competitors, it is more likely that the 
object has been overvalued and, as a result, firms must take a more pessimistic view 
of winning bids when more competitors enter. However, Pinkse and Tan ?????? 
show that strategic behavior can cause bids to increase or decrease in the number of 
opponents under both the private and common value paradigms. Gilley and Karels 
?????? themselves also show that the above prediction does not always hold when 
the number of bidders is very small. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the auctions 
here can be modeled using the private value paradigm based on only this result. Recent 
studies introduce selection tests for common and private value auctions ?see, for 
example, Haile et al. ???????.
?? Because we would like to observe the differences in incumbent and entrant bidding 
behavior for the same auction, it is appropriate to focus on observations with similar 
characteristics. When the load factor is low, there appears to be some significant 
factors that prevent incumbents from winning auctions when there is an entrant as a 
rival. Therefore, even after controlling for the independent variables, it would seem 
that incumbents and entrants are not in the same situation for auctions with low load 
factors. Similarly, when the load factor is high, there appear to be some significant 
factors that prevent entrants from participating in the auction. For this reason, we use 
only observations of auctions with a load range between ?? and ??% for the quantile 
regressions.
?? The results for the remaining quantiles are also available upon request.
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